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For over a century, lawyers and scholars have debated whether por-
nography is protected by the free speech principle. 1 In this essay, I will
show why Jeffrey Sherman's 1995 article, Love Speech: The Social Utility
of Pornography,2 makes a major contribution to this debate, even though it
never explicitly addresses it.
I will begin with the fundamentals of free speech theory. Why is there
free speech protection at all? I will describe the classic answer to this ques-
tion developed by James Madison. Then I will rebut the narrow construc-
tion of Madison's argument that was once proffered by Robert Bork. I will
show why Madison's argument reaches toward, but does not fully defend, a
right to pornography. Then I will show why Sherman's work completes the
Madisonian argument.
* John Paul Stevens Professor of Law and Professor of Political Science, Northwestern Univer-
sity. Thanks to Harry Clor, Jason DeSanto, Rick Gamett, Edward Hartnett, Marc Poirier, Martin Re-
dish, Frederick Schauer, Jeffrey Sherman, Steven D. Smith, and the Seton Hall University School of
Law faculty colloquium for comments. Special thanks to Thomas Healy for unusually probing and
tenacious criticism. Thanks, as usual, to Marcia Lehr for indispensable research assistance. When I was
invited to contribute to this issue, I was told that the issue would be dedicated to Prof. Sherman, but that
the articles should be about general issues of sexual orientation and the law, and were not expected to
be about his scholarship. However, since I have several times gestured toward that scholarship in
making a point about free speech law, this is a good place to turn that gesture into a reasoned argument.
See Andrew Koppelman, Is Pornography "Speech"?, 14 LEGAL THEORY 71, 83 n.58 (2008); Andrew
Koppelman, Free Speech and Pornography: A Response to James Weinstein, 31 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 899, 910 n.64 (2007); Andrew Koppelman, Does Obscenity Cause Moral Harm?, 105
COLUM. L. REV. 1635, 1661 n.133 (2005) (all citing Sherman).
I. See generally HELEN LEFKOWITZ HOROWITZ, REREADING SEX: BATTLES OVER SEXUAL
KNOWLEDGE AND SUPPRESSION IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (2003); DAVID M. RABBAN,
FREE SPEECH IN ITS FORGOTTEN YEARS 27-44, 193-200 (1997). By "pornography," I refer to pub-
lished sexually explicit material that is designed specifically for the purpose of sexually arousing its
audience. It is a broader category than "obscenity," a legal term of art to denote material that the Su-
preme Court has deemed unprotected. I use the broader term because I wish to leave open, at the outset
of the inquiry, the possibility that (as some people think) no pornography should be unprotected.
2. Jeffrey G. Sherman, Love Speech: The Social Utility of Pornography, 47 STAN. L. REV. 661
(1995).
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I. MADISONiAN FREE SPEECH
The First Amendment provides in pertinent part that "Congress shall
make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press."'3 The
plain language is uncertain as to the scope of its protection. Many things
that one can do with language have been held to be outside its protection,
notably defamation with actual malice,4 false or misleading commercial
advertising, 5 fraudulent solicitation, 6 incitement to lawbreaking, 7 or threats
of violence. 8 It is unlikely that the framers of the Amendment intended to
protect these things, but original intent is a poor source of authority, be-
cause the framers did not give much thought to any of the controversial
problems of interpretation that have since come before courts. 9
Courts and scholars have offered a number of different accounts of
why free speech is protected, each account implying a different scope of
protection. The people can't control the government if the government gets
to control what the people think.' 0 Discussion controlled by the state is less
likely to discover truth than a free market in ideas." Human dignity de-
pends on the freedom of the mind. 12 Each of these plays some role in free
3. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
4. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 283-84 (1964).
5. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771-72 &
n.24 (1976); see also In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982) ("But when the particular content or
method of the advertising suggests that it is inherently misleading or when experience has proved that
in fact such advertising is subject to abuse, the States may impose appropriate restrictions. Misleading
advertising may be prohibited entirely.").
6. I11. ex rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing Assocs., 538 U.S. 600, 624 (2003).
7. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
8. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359-360 (2003).
9. See LEONARD W. LEVY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS (1985).
10. The Supreme Court has stated that:
Whatever differences may exist about interpretation of the First Amendment, there is practi-
cally universal agreement that a major purpose of that Amendment was to protect the free dis-
cussion of governmental affairs. This of course includes discussion of candidates, structures
and forms of government, the manner in which government is operated or should be operated
and such matters relating to political processes.
Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218-19 (1966). See also NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S.
886, 913 (1982); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S.
359, 369 (1931); ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF
THE PEOPLE (1960); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH (1993);
Harry Kalven Jr., The New York Times Case: A Note on "The Central Meaning of the First Amend-
ment," 1964 SUP. CT. REV. 191.
11. See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) ("It is the purpose of the First
Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail...");
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting); JOHN STUART MILL, ON
LIBERTY (Elizabeth Rapaport ed., Hackett Publ'g Co. 1978) (1859).
12. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977); MARTIN REDISH, FREEDOM OF
EXPRESSION: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS (1984); C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom
of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REv. 964 (1978); David A.J. Richards, Free Speech and Obscenity Law: To-
ward a Moral Theory of the First Amendment, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 45 (1974); Thomas Scanlon, Jr., A
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speech law. Frederick Schauer has suggested that "we might in fact have
several first amendments, ' 13 one directed toward government suppression
of its critics, another toward open inquiry in the sciences, and so forth.
Of these accounts, Eric Barendt observes, "the argument from democ-
racy has been much the most influential theory in the development of con-
temporary free speech law."' 14 There are arguments for the protection of
pornography that rely on the advancement of truth or the fulfillment of
human autonomy, 15 but an argument tied to the democratic rationale may
stand on firmer ground. But is it possible to make such an argument per-
suasive?
The classic formulation of the democratic justification for free speech
is that of James Madison in his 1799 Report on the Virginia Resolutions.
The Sedition Act of 1798 made it a crime to write about Congress or the
President "with intent to defame" or "to excite against them. . . the hatred
of the good people of the United States."'16 Madison wrote a resolution,
subsequently enacted by the Virginia legislature, declaring that the Sedition
Act was unconstitutional. The Act, the resolution declared, "ought to pro-
duce universal alarm, because it is leveled against the right of freely exam-
ining public characters and measures, and of free communication among
the people thereon, which has ever been justly deemed the only effectual
guardian of every other right."' 17 He supported the resolution with a report
elaborating on its claims. Madison's best argument was the following:
1. The Constitution supposes that the President, the Congress,
and each of its Houses may not discharge their trusts, either
from defect of judgment or other causes. Hence they are all
made responsible to their constituents, at the returning peri-
ods of election; and the President, who is singly intrusted
with very great powers, is, as a further guard, subjected to an
intermediate impeachment.
2. Should it happen, as the Constitution supposes it may hap-
pen, that either of these branches of the government may not
have duly discharged its trust, it is natural and proper that,
according to the cause and degree of their faults, they should
Theory of Freedom of Expression, I PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 204 (1972); David A. Strauss, Persuasion,
Autonomy, and Freedom of Expression, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 334 (1991).
13. Frederick Schauer, Must Speech Be Special?, 78 Nw. U. L. REv. 1284, 1303 (1983).
14. ERIC BARENDT, FREEDOM OF SPEECH 20 (2d ed. 2005).
15. See, e.g., NADINE STROSSEN, DEFENDING PORNOGRAPHY: FREE SPEECH, SEX, AND THE FIGHT
FOR WOMEN'S RIGHTS (1995).
16. Ch. 74, § 2, 1 Stat. 596, 596-97 (1798).
17. James Madison, The Virginia Report, in THE MIND OF THE FOUNDER: SOURCES OF THE
POLITICAL THOUGHT OF JAMES MADISON 243 (Marvin Meyers ed., rev. ed. 1981).
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be brought into contempt or disrepute, and incur the hatred
of the people.
3. Whether it has, in any case, happened that the proceedings
of either, or all of those branches evince such a violation of
duty as to justify a contempt, a disrepute, or hatred among
the people, can only be determined by a free examination
thereof, and a free communication among the people
thereon. 
18
If public officials are to be held accountable by elections, then the
electors must be able to discuss among themselves the merits of the office-
holders.
Thus, free speech must, at a minimum, protect criticism of the incum-
bent government. It must bar censorship by the incumbent government that
inhibits discourse that would tend to induce voters to vote against incum-
bents, or that would otherwise forestall political change.
The argument is a powerful one, not least because it relies not at all on
the ambiguous text of the First Amendment. It rather infers a right of free
speech from the structural commitment to elections.
I. THE LIMITS OF MADISON
Madison does not offer a general theory of free speech, or even an ac-
count of where the boundaries of protected speech lie. His aim simply is to
show that the Sedition Act is unconstitutional. And so we are left with a
problem: if we do accept Madison's argument, what speech have we com-
mitted ourselves to protect?
One well-known answer is that offered by Robert Bork in a 1971 arti-
cle. 19 Bork claimed that, because the function of the free speech guarantee
is to protect political discussion, "[t]he category of protected speech should
consist of speech concerned with governmental behavior, policy or person-
nel, whether the governmental unit involved is executive, legislative, judi-
cial or administrative. ' 20 Protection extends only to "explicitly and
predominantly political speech."'21 There, is, however, no basis for protect-
ing any art and literature (or, for that matter, any other speech) that is not
explicitly political. 22
18. Id. at 263-64.
19. Robert Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971).
20. Id. at 27-28.
21. Id. at 26.
22. Bork substantially retreated from this position during the 1987 hearings on his failed Supreme
Court nomination. ETHAN BRONNER, BATrLE FOR JUSTICE: HOW THE BORK NOMINATION SHOOK
AMERICA 242-51 (1989); NORMAN VIEIRA & LEONARD GROSS, SUPREME COURT APPOINTMENTS:
[Vol 84:2
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Bork's view is too cramped, even if free speech is understood in
purely Madisonian terms. To see the limits of Bork's argument, even as a
defense of political speech, it should be sufficient to note that some propo-
sitions of fact, not explicitly political, can nonetheless obviously function
as criticism of incumbent government. It should also be clear that Madi-
son's approach to free speech condemns state censorship of at least some
propositions of fact, even if these are not explicitly political.
Consider a recent controversy involving scientific speech. The Ad-
ministration of President George W. Bush was accused of distorting scien-
tific knowledge by manipulating scientific advisory committees, distorting
and suppressing official statements of scientific information, and interfer-
ing with scientific research. Such distortions were alleged most particularly
with respect to issues that concern the religious right, such as abortion,
abstinence education, and stem cell research, and issues with significant
economic consequences for the President's large corporate supporters, such
as workplace safety and global warming. 23
Now suppose that Congress enacted a law making it a crime to allege
(1) that "abstinence only" sex education does not diminish the incidence of
teen pregnancy, (2) that the planet is becoming warmer because of human
use of carbon-based fuels, or (3) that abortions do not increase the risk of
breast cancer. 24 Bork's principle would not be violated by such a law. None
JUDGE BORK AND THE POLITICIZATION OF SENATE CONFIRMATIONS 99-105 (1998). He has since
conceded that novels, plays, and scientific speech "are frequently freighted with political meaning[,]"
but he has fallen back on the view that pornography contains no ideas. ROBERT H. BORK, A TIME TO
SPEAK: SELECTED WRITINGS AND ARGUMENTS 219 (2008). His free speech views have become un-
clear. He rejects the rule that pornography, to be unprotected, must lack serious literary, artistic, politi-
cal, or scientific value, id. at 243-45, and the idea that there is "a right to display a picture of the Virgin
Mary festooned with pornographic pictures and cow dung[,]" id. at 379, but does not explain what then
distinguishes pornography from protected art. Similar doubts are raised by his claim that "stories depict-
ing the kidnapping, mutilation, raping, and murder of children do not, to anyone with a degree of com-
mon sense, qualify as ideas." ROBERT H. BORK, SLOUCHING TOWARDS GOMORRAH: MODERN
LIBERALISM AND AMERICAN DECLINE 148 (1996). He laments "the Court's reckless expansion of the
'speech' protected by the First Amendment to encompass ... a sickening variety of obscenities."
Robert H. Bork, The Judge's Role in Law and Culture, I AVE MARIA L. REV. 19, 21 (2003). Appended
to this sentence is a citation to, inter alia, Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380 (1957), which he accurately
summarizes as "holding unconstitutional a ban on the sale to adults of books deemed harmful to chil-
dren." Id. at 21 n.7. Evidently Bork now thinks that it is permissible for a state to "reduce the adult
population... to reading only what is fit for children." Butler, 352 U.S. at 383. This implies an even
narrower interpretation of the First Amendment than his original view, since some core political speech
may be unfit for consumption by children. It is doubtful whether, on this view, the Amendment would
protect publication of Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr's report on the Clinton-Lewinsky scandal, for
example.
23. See Andrew C. Revkin, Bush vs. the Laureates: How Science Became a Partisan Issue, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 19, 2004, at Fl; Alison McCook, Sizing Up Bush on Science, THE SCIENTIST, Oct. 31,
2006, at 31; H.R. Comm. on Government Reform, Minority Staff Spec. Investigations Division, Politics
and Science in the Bush Administration (updated Nov. 13, 2003).
24. All of these are scientific claims that contradict positions taken by the Bush Administration.
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of the forbidden claims are "explicitly and predominantly political speech."
Yet all of them are obviously interventions into ongoing political contro-
versies. The law in question is problematic for just the same reasons as the
1798 Sedition Act: it is an attempt to entrench the incumbent government
by suppressing speech critical of that government.
Bork observes correctly that "the rationale of the first amendment
cannot be the protection of all things or activities that influence political
attitudes. ' 25 All speech, and indeed all conduct, may do that, but it would
be silly to say that the First Amendment bans government from regulating
conduct.
On the other hand, here the speech is obviously political because its
context makes it so. Perhaps that is enough to make it count as "speech
about how we are governed."'26
If so, free speech protection should be extended to protect the asser-
tion of politically relevant facts, even if that assertion is not expressly po-
litical. But this obviously doesn't get us to pornography. Is there an
argument for a still further extension of Madisonian free speech theory?
Literature can be implicitly critical of government in just the way that
scientific speech can be. Bork's logic easily condemns the suppression,
before the Civil War, of abolitionist pamphlets by Southern governments
and the U.S. post office. These almost always included proposals to change
the law. 27 The most potent single antislavery publication, however, was a
novel, Harriet Beecher Stowe's Uncle Tom's Cabin.28 Would no Madison-
ian problem be raised by its suppression? 2
9
Yet even this doesn't get us to pornography. Stowe's novel is offering
an opinion about an obviously political issue, albeit in literary form. Can
the same be said of pornography?
See H.R. Comm. on Government Reform, supra note 23.
25. Bork, supra note 19, at 28. This objection is important, because it destroys Alexander Meik-
lejohn's rather summary neo-Madisonian argument for protection of art and literature. See Alexander
Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 SuP. CT. REV. 245, 256-57. The present article
seeks to rehabilitate Meiklejohn's claim.
26. Bork, supra note 19, at 28.
27. See MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, "THE PEOPLE'S DARLING PRIVILEGE":
STRUGGLES FOR FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN AMERICAN HISTORY 117-299 (2000); W. SHERMAN
SAVAGE, THE CONTROVERSY OVER THE DISTRIBUTION OF ABOLITION LITERATURE 1830-1860 (1938).
28. Within ten years of its publication, "it had sold more than two million copies in the United
States, making it the best seller of all time in proportion to population." JAMES B. MCPHERSON, BATTLE
CRY OF FREEDOM: THE CIVIL WAR ERA 89 (1988).
29. Stowe's novel was in fact hard to obtain in the South, but the suppression was conducted
primarily by extralegal means, such as violence against its distributors. See THOMAS F. GOSSETT,
UNCLE TOM'S CABIN AND AMERICAN CULTURE 210-11 (1985); CLAIRE PARFAIT, THE PUBLISHING
HISTORY OF UNCLE TOM'S CABIN, 1852-2002, at 94-98 (2007).
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II. THE MADISONIAN PORNOGRAPHY PROBLEM
One of the classic arguments against protection of pornography claims
that pornography is not speech because it contains no ideas. If this is true,
then it follows a fortiori that pornography cannot contain political ideas.
The Supreme Court has several times embraced this claim. The germinal
case of Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire30 declared that "certain well-defined
and narrowly limited classes of speech," among them "the lewd and ob-
scene," were outside the protection of the First Amendment, because "such
utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such
slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived
from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and moral-
ity."31 When it announced the present constitutional test for unprotected
obscenity, the Court declared that "[p]reventing unlimited display or distri-
bution of obscene material, which by definition lacks any serious literary,
artistic, political, or scientific value as communication, is distinct from a
control of reason and the intellect."'32
The Court's argument, however, rests on an impoverished conception
of reason and the intellect.
It is possible to disagree with the incumbent government, not just
about matters of fact, but also about matters of value. Political speech con-
cerns practical questions. Practical reason involves deliberation about
norms, about what is obligatory and what is desirable.
If questions of what is desirable are a part of political discourse, then
political discourse cannot only take the form of deductive demonstration.If
I am going to argue that something is intrinsically valuable-say, if I want
to argue that the Grand Canyon should be kept as a national park and
shielded from development, merely because it is beautiful-then the only
way I can hope to convince you is to somehow get you to perceive its
beauty.
Robert Post rejects Bork's proposal because the formation of a com-
mon democratic will requires "deliberation about our identity as a people,
as well as about what specifically we want our government to do."
33 Quot-
30. 315 U.S. 568(1942).
31. Id. at 571-72.
32. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 67 (1973) (citation omitted) (citing John M.
Finnis, "Reason and Passion ": The Constitutional Dialectic of Free Speech and Obscenity, 116 U. PA.
L. REV. 222 (1967)); see also Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 34-35 (1973); Roth v. United States,
354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957). i have addressed this claim at greater length elsewhere. See Andrew Kop-
pelman, Is Pornography "Speech "?, 14 LEGAL THEORY 71 (2008); Andrew Koppelman, Free Speech
and Pornography: A Response to James Weinstein, 31 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 899 (2007).
33. ROBERT C. POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS: DEMOCRACY, COMMUNITY AND
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ing Charles Taylor, Post defines "identity" as "an orientation in 'moral
space,' a framework within which we 'can try to determine from case to
case what is good, or valuable, or what ought to be done."' 34 "To classify
speech as public discourse is ... to deem it relevant to this collective proc-
ess of self-definition and decision-making. ' 35 Speech that concerns iden-
tity in this sense is implicitly political.
All speech is potentially relevant to this process, so this argument
proves too much. The Court is properly unwilling to restrict, for example,
ordinary libel suits by private citizens, even though defamation is obviously
relevant to collective self-definition. Defamation of public officials is a
different matter: the court has restricted such suits because "would-be crit-
ics of official conduct may be deterred from voicing their criticism, even
though it is believed to be true and even though it is in fact true, because of
doubt whether it can be proved in court or fear of the expense of having to
do so." '36 A defamed public official therefore must prove that the defama-
tory statement "with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard
of whether it was false or not. ' 37 The court has extended this protection
beyond defamation of public officeholders, but has not displaced all of
defamation law: discussion of "matters of public concern" is significantly
protected from defamation suits; discussion that is not about such matters is
not. So a great deal turns on what is deemed "public." It is hard to see how
the Court could have avoided devising a categorization of this kind, but the
effort inevitably begets intractable difficulties.
In practice, Post observes, the Court uses this term to signify two very
different ideas. One conception of public concern is normative: "the speech
at issue is about matters that ought to be of interest to those who practice
the art of democratic self-governance. '38 Sometimes, however, the mean-
ing is descriptive: "the speech at issue concerns matters that large numbers
of people already know, and thus are 'public' in a purely empirical
sense."' 39 The Court is unable to rest comfortably in either of these mean-
ings. The normative conception, to the extent that it is used to exclude
speech from public discourse, is incompatible with the democracy it seeks
to protect, because it arrogates to the courts the question of what ought to
MANAGEMENT 166 (1995).
34. Id. at 273 (quoting CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF: THE MAKING OF THE MODERN
IDENTITY 27-28 (1989)).
35. Id. at 166.
36. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964).
37. Id. at 280.




be on the political agenda. The descriptive conception, however, is overin-
clusive and underinclusive: it includes trivia about celebrities, but excludes
unknown matters that are obviously relevant to governance.
The very effort to distinguish public from private matters, Post ob-
serves, is already politically loaded, and presupposes controversial criteria
about the proper subject of politics. 40 "[A]ll speech is potentially relevant
to democratic self-governance, and hence according to democratic logic all
speech ought to be classified as public discourse. '41 But, Post notes, we
have other commitments beside public discourse, and public discourse
itself depends on some civility norms. "The many factors relevant to the
classification of speech as public discourse thus resist expression in the
form of clear, uniform, and helpful doctrinal rules."'42
The delineation of matters of public concern that we actually have
draws on both conceptions: it is relevant if a matter is actually an object of
public discussion, and it is relevant if it is clearly pertinent to governance.43
If a given communication is both the object of discussion and is relevant to
live political issues, then it is clearly public discourse. That is why scien-
tific speech about global warming presents a very easy case. The same can
be said of any general proposition of fact, since descriptions of the world
are such a proximate input of politics.
The same point, I will now argue, is true of general propositions of
value.
One object of political contestation, obviously salient today, is the
question of what uses of the sexual faculties are good and ought to be pro-
tected, perhaps even approved of, by the state. How is one to promote a
point of view on that issue?
Robert George observes that:
[I]ntrinsic values, as ultimate reasons for action, cannot be de-
duced or inferred. We do not, for example, infer the intrinsic
goodness of health from the fact, if it is a fact, that people every-
where seem to desire it.... We see the point of acting for the sake
of health, in ourselves or in others, just for its own sake, without
the benefit of any such inference. 44
If the value of health is defended as a means to some other end, then the
question will arise why that is a good thing; the chain of reasoning has to
40. See id. at 280-82.
41. Id. at 175.
42. Id. at 173.
43. One aspect of pornography which is probative of the first factor is the fact that it is dissemi-
nated through media of mass communication. See id. at 164-73. It is also always presumptively im-
proper to ban speech on the basis of particular communities' civility rules. Id. at 148-50.
44. ROBERT P. GEORGE, IN DEFENSE OF NATURAL LAW 48 (1999) (emphasis added).
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conclude somewhere, with some good that is deemed good in itself and not
as a means to something else. The goodness of intrinsic goods can only be
defended dialectically:
While [intrinsic goods] may be defended by dialectical arguments de-
signed either to rebut arguments against them, or to show up the defects
or inadequacies of ethical theories that attempt to do without them, they
cannot themselves be deduced or inferred or derived from more funda-
mental premises. One cannot argue one's way to them (the way one can,
on the basis of more fundamental premises, argue one's way to a conclu-
sion). The claim that they are self-evident does not imply that they are
undeniable or, still less, that no one denies them. What it does imply is
that the practical intellect may grasp them, and practical judgment can
affirm them without the need for a derivation. (which is not to say that
they can be grasped without an understanding of the realities to which
they refer.) 45
Thus, for example, George thinks that homosexual sex damages the good
of marriage-a good that he understands as the indissoluble union of a man
and a woman, in which contraception is never used. He can make his case
only by showing that marriage is a good with just the characteristics he
describes, and is susceptible to damage in the ways he imagines. 46 These
claims are reasoned claims, and their political entailments are obvious. For
example, he has invoked them to justify the criminalization of homosexual
sex and a constitutional amendment against same-sex marriage. 47 Claims to
the contrary, that homosexual sex is valuable, are political in exactly the
same way. How is this disagreement to be resolved? George proposes dia-
lectical debate. I'm with him: we are both professors, former Princeton
colleagues, and friends; philosophical debate is what we do.
There are, however, other means of persuasion. Thomas Scanlon ob-
serves that, if some citizens want to persuade others to change their views
about sexual mores:
Earnest treatises on the virtues of sexually liberated society can be relia-
bly predicted to have no effect on prevailing attitudes towards sex. What
is more likely to have such an effect is for people to discover that they
find exciting and attractive portrayals of sex which they formerly thought
45. Id. at 45. For this reason, it is not the case that claims of value are inevitably parasitic on
claims of fact, as Larry Alexander claims. LARRY ALEXANDER, IS THERE A RIGHT OF FREEDOM OF
EXPRESSION? 71 (2005).
46. See Patrick Lee & Robert P. George, What Sex Can Be: Self-Alienation, Illusion, or One-Flesh
Union, 42 AM. J. JURIS. 135 (1997). For a critique of this argument, see ANDREW KOPPELMAN, THE
GAY RIGHTS QUESTION IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN LAW 80-93 (2002); Andrew Koppelman, The
Decline and Fall of the Case Against Same-Sex Marriage, 2 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 5 (2004); Andrew
Koppelman, Is Marriage Inherently Heterosexual?, 42 AM. J. JURIS. 51 (1997).
47. Robert P. George, The Concept of Public Morality, 45 AM. J. JURIS. 17, 30-31 (2000); Robert
P. George, One Man and One Woman, WALL ST. J., Nov. 28, 2003, at A8; Robert P. George, The 2 8 h
Amendment, NAT'L REV., July 23, 2001, at 32.
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offensive or, vice versa, that they find boring and offensive what they
had expected to find exciting and liberating.48
But this may all seem quite theoretical. It might appear fanciful to
suggest that pornography is actually likely to constitute a genuine interven-
tion into political life. James Weinstein thinks it a "fairly safe assumption"
that "the number of people who produce or distribute pornography primar-
ily for political purposes is relatively small."'49 This is why Sherman's work
is so important.
III. THE IMPORTANCE OF JEFFREY SHERMAN
Love Speech responds to the arguments of some feminists, notably
Catharine MacKinnon and Cass Sunstein, who claim that all pornography
promotes male sexual supremacy and dehumanizes both its producers and
its consumers. MacKinnon and Sunstein both want to empower the law to
act against pornography, but Sherman does not directly attack their legal
arguments. His concern is centrally with their normative claims. He aims to
rebut the view that pornography as such is worthless and harmful. Sherman
is dissatisfied with the "grudging and unengaged" 50 defense of pornogra-
phy that liberal theorists offer, which concedes that pornography is of low
value but seeks to defend it nonetheless.
Sherman wants to show that pornography is valuable. He does this by
focusing on one kind of pornography-that directed at gay men.
Such pornography, he argues, has been particularly liberating for
young gay men raised in conservative households, whose predicament is
largely a consequence of the way in which they have been kept in igno-
rance. Ignorance induced by the suppression of information is, of course,
one of the central evils that the First Amendment aims to prevent. Sherman
eloquently describes the consequences of this ignorance:
The young gay male inhabits a world that teaches him to despise his
most powerful feelings. This world isolates him from his parents, who
are probably not gay themselves and who may be as homophobic as his
tormentors; tells him that people like him are sick, contemptible, and
justly despised; offers him no positive images of gay sexuality and no
hope of integrating his sexuality with the rest of his life. He experiences
sexual impulses but receives no encouragement or instruction about how
to act upon those feelings in a healthy, self-affirming manner. His het-
erosexual contemporaries enjoy considerable encouragement from peers
48. T. M. Scanlon, Jr., Freedom of Expression and Categories of Expression, 40 U. PITT. L. REV.
519, 547 (1979).
49. James Weinstein, Democracy Sex and the First Amendment, 31 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 865, 889 (2007).
50. Sherman, supra note 2, at 662.
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and family and find heartening models in the ubiquitous images of ideal-
ized or graphic heterosexual coupling that flood the airwaves and motion
picture screens, but heterocentrism and homophobia leave the young gay
man fearing that gay sexual encounters are necessarily furtive and debas-
ing. Many gay men remember feeling as if they were "the only one."
Even if they did not feel totally alone, they believed they were the only
gay men who were not sly sexual predators. 51
For such men, gay pornography is a revelation. The revelation consists
both in the information that it provides and the valuation it places on this
information. "[A] gay adolescent male's encounter with gay pornogra-
phy.., explodes negative stereotypes that the young man has internalized
and offers him models of exuberant, affirming, unashamed sexual interac-
tions between desirable men."'52
Explicitly sexual images provide this affirmation in a way that non-
sexual images cannot. "[T]he issue in a young gay man's quest for self-
acknowledgement and self-acceptance is not holding hands or hugging or
kissing or running through a meadow in slow motion. The issue is the sex-
ual act."' 53 Explicit pornography, or even photographs of naked men that
suggest sexual availability, can and do lead gay teenagers to "realize that
there were others out there with sexual feelings for men: indeed, enough of
them to create a market for such photographs. '54
Sherman shows that pornography has played an important role in
many young gay men's development of their own self-understanding. One
writer described a magazine with photos of nude men posing as "the first
clue I ever had that being queer existed out there in the world. '55 Sherman
also cites a study finding that pornography is an important source of infor-
mation about sex for college-age gay men.56
Sherman's interest in legal doctrine is primarily aimed at showing
how feminist antipornography standards lend themselves to inappropriate
deployment against gay pornography. 57 He does not discuss basic free
speech theory. Perhaps he is discouraged from doing so by free speech
theorists' tendency to bracket the question of pornography's value. Since
free speech theory protects even worthless and harmful speech,58 it is a
51. Id. at 681-82 (footnotes omitted).
52. Id. at 682.
53. Id. at 683.
54. Id. at 685 n.130.
55. Id. at 688 (quoting PAUL MONETTE, BECOMING A MAN: HALF A LIFE STORY 82-83 (1992)).
56. Id. at 682 (citing David F. Duncan & J. William Donnelly, Pornography as a Source of Sex
Information for Students at a Private Northeastern University, 68 PSYCH. REP. 782 (1991)).
57. Id. at 694-99.
58. See George Kateb, The Freedom of Worthless and Harmful Speech, in LIBERALISM WITHOUT
ILLUSIONS: ESSAYS ON LIBERAL THEORY AND THE POLITICAL VISION OF JUDITH N. SHKLAR 220
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poor vehicle for developing his claim that gay male pornography is neither
worthless nor harmful.
Here I want to focus not on the question of pornography's therapeutic
value for individuals, but rather on the value of pornography as political
speech. What Sherman has shown is that gay male pornography, which
gave many gay men an early window into their own sexuality, has played a
significant role in the emergence of the gay rights movement, which in turn
gave rise to one of the most pressing and divisive questions in contempo-
rary American politics. Absent gay pornography, the course of modern
American politics might have been very different.
IV. THE BOUNDARIES OF PUBLIC DISCOURSE
Recall that, according to Post, the classification of speech as protected
"public discourse" turns on two factors: whether the subject matter is actu-
ally an object of public discussion, and whether it is clearly pertinent to
governance. The easiest case for protection is speech about a matter that is
both the object of public discussion and is relevant to live political issues.
Sherman shows that pornography, at least gay male pornography, satisfies
both of these criteria.
It is no longer possible to claim without embarrassment that the proper
use of the sexual faculties is not an appropriate subject matter for political
debate. 59 Pornography speaks directly to that subject matter. Sherman has
taught us that it has in fact operated in just the way imagined by Scanlon,
by persuading its audience "that they find exciting and attractive portrayals
of sex which they formerly thought offensive."
Post argues that "there can be no final account of the boundaries of the
domain of public discourse. We can and do have firm convictions about the
core of that domain, but its periphery will remain both ideological and
vague, subject to an endless negotiation between democracy and commu-
nity life."'60
Sherman has shown that at least some pornography is not at the pe-
riphery of public discourse about sexuality. It is at the core. It provides
politically relevant information about the kinds of sexual practices that
people engage in. It is persuasive speech about the very general question of
what kinds of sex are humanly attractive.
(Bernard Yack ed., 1996).
59. It was once. Any approving reference to same-sex relationships subjected a publication to
censorship as recently as the 1960s. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., GAYLAW: CHALLENGING THE
APARTHEID OF THE CLOSET 32-34, 46-49, 78, 116-123 (1999).
60. POST, supra note 33, at 177 (footnote omitted).
2009]
CHICA GO-KENT LAW REVIEW
If there's a larger lesson here, it is that speech consisting of claims
about what goods are worth pursuing should always be understood to be
part of public discourse. Since Socrates, a central question for philosophy
has been that of how we ought to live. It is also the central question for
democracy. In order to answer that question, we need to be able to articu-
late visions and ideas of the good, even if those are not obviously politi-
cal. 61 They always have political implications. That is why Plato wanted to
expel the poets from his Republic.
The political agenda is up to us, but we cannot control it unless the po-
litical agenda is embedded within a larger conversation about the good. It is
only in light of some conception of the good that it makes any sense to put
anything at all onto the political agenda. One cannot engage in any kind of
practical reasoning without reference to what is good.62 Conversation about
what is good is thus the center of public discourse, the motor that powers
all collective decisions.
This is why free speech protects even apparently nonpolitical art. All
art is communication from one mind to another. Art always concerns ideas
of value, even if the value in question is only a claim about the self-
contained value of art itself. Art, then, is not and cannot be peripheral to
politics. Contra Plato, it would be disastrous to expel the poets from the
city. They are the city.
Bork's objection is that the capacity to influence political attitudes
does not distinguish speech from conduct, and the First Amendment cannot
be reasonably understood to bar government regulations of conduct. He
argues that the line he proposes to draw is necessary "[i]f the dialectical
progression is not to become an analogical stampede. ' 63 This amounts to a
claim that no other workable line can be drawn.
In first amendment law today, public discourse is that line. It is admit-
tedly a somewhat fuzzy line, but not an unworkable one. Most free speech
cases are easy cases, even if theory has difficulty explaining why. 64 I have
here offered one theoretical clarification: Laws should be invalidated when
they seek to block the communication of claims about what goods are
worth pursuing-claims, to borrow Taylor's phrase, about our appropriate
orientation in moral space.
61. Put in Post's terms, speech articulating such ideas invariably satisfies his second factor for
determining whether speech is public discourse: it is always pertinent to governance.
62. See RICHARD KRAUT, WHAT IS GOOD AND WHY 210 (2007).
63. Bork, supra note 19, at 27.
64. Post notes this in Reconciling Theory and Doctrine in First Amendment Jurisprudence, in




Gay pornography makes such claims. "In its dissenting voice," Leslie
Green observes, "gay pornography celebrates the male body as sexually
desirable to other men; it displays men enacting this desire; it focuses our
attention on that one fact about them; it exaggerates and overvalues it.
''65
The same point can be made about pornography more generally. Pornogra-
phy has always addressed our orientation in moral space. Lynn Hunt ob-
serves that, after 1660, when pornography first emerged as a distinctive
genre, "the self-conscious aim of arousing sexual desire in the reader" was
accompanied by "the juxtaposition of the material truth of sex against the
hypocritical conventions of society and the rulings of the church" and that
these "were related to the new emphasis on the value of nature and the
senses as sources of authority. '66 Helen Lefkowitz Horowitz, in a marvel-
ous study of discourse on sex in nineteenth century America, has shown
that a vibrant conversation about marriage, contraception, and sexual ethics
was choked off near the end of the century by the newly energized censor-
ship of obscenity (which at that time was very broadly defined, to include
any dissenting speech about sexual mores). 67 Even pornography that makes
no claims about social institutions, however, addresses questions of moral
orientation. It claims that certain pleasures are goods worth pursuing. Mate-
rial that does not so claim may sexually arouse some viewers, but it does
not aim at such arousal and so is not pornography.
The fact that pornography aims specifically at sexual arousal is some-
times cited as a reason to exclude it from protection, and that is what the
Supreme Court has done with the ill-defined subset of pornography it
deems "obscene." '68 The argument I have developed here shows that this is
a perverse conclusion, as perverse as the idea that speech forfeits protection
if it tends to diminish an incumbent politician's chances of reelection.69
The protection of ideas of the good is reflected in another free speech
rule that may appear to be only tangentially related to the question of pro-
tection of pornography, but which actually reflects the considerations that I
have articulated here. That is the prohibition of viewpoint discrimination.
Claims about what is good, outside the sexual sphere, are precisely what
65. Leslie Green, Pornographies, 8 J. POL. PHIL. 27, 48 (2000).
66. LYNN HUNT, THE INVENTION OF PORNOGRAPHY 30 (1993).
67. Horowitz, supra note 1.
68. This position is described and critiqued in Andrew Koppelman, Is Pornography "Speech "?,
14 LEGAL THEORY 71 (2008), and Andrew Koppelman, Free Speech and Pornography: A Response to
James Weinstein, 31 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 899 (2007).
69. I know that sounds like something I made up, but in United States v. Cooper, 25 F.Cas. 631
(C.C.D. Pa. 1800), Supreme Court Justice Samuel Chase, presiding at trial, charged the jury that the
defendant had violated the statute, because his "evident design" was "to arouse the people against the
president so as to influence their minds against him on the next election." Id. at 641.
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free speech law means by "viewpoints." Regulations of speech that are
directed at the content of the speech, and penalize it for making claims
when there would be no penalty for making opposite claims, are not "view-
point discrimination," as the law defines it, if they do not involve claims
about the good. Defamation, fraudulent solicitation, incitement to law-
breaking, threats of violence, or the other modes of verbal conduct that are
traditionally placed outside the realm of free speech protection are not pro-
tected by the viewpoint discrimination ban. Some explanation is needed for
this. Viewpoints of a kind are certainly reflected in speech alleging that the
mayor is a child molester (when he really isn't), that the bonds I am trying
to sell you are not counterfeit, that we ought to go lynch that guy, and that I
will shoot you if you don't give me your wallet. The speech in each of
these cases is unprotected, even though speech asserting the opposite would
not be penalized. The principle I have advocated does not come into play
here. The speech in each of these cases presents a viewpoint, but none of
the viewpoints involve claims about what goods should be pursued .70
Restrictions on speech are unconstitutional if they discriminate on the
basis of viewpoint, even if the speech that is regulated is worthless for free
speech purposes.71 This rule has elicited the objection that constitutionally
worthless speech by definition does not deserve free speech protection. 72
Sherman shows, however, that the ban on viewpoint discrimination is not
overinclusive, at least when it protects pornography: it is not the case that,
if the ban on viewpoint discrimination is relaxed to permit suppression of
pornography, nothing of free speech value is lost.73
70. A distinction implicit in these rules is that between claims of value and claims of fact. Claims
of fact, even untrue claims, see New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), discussed supra
text accompanying notes 36-37, may or may not be protected. Claims of value always are.
Larry Alexander argues that the fact-value distinction is incoherent, at least as a basis for free
speech doctrine. When government tries to obstruct value-laden expression because it wants to prevent
the audience from adopting the values advocated therein, this must be because the expression is "heav-
ily larded with implicit factual assertions" and it is the audience's acceptance of these (by hypothesis
false) assertions that government wants to prevent.
A statement asserting an incorrect value must at some level be mistaken factually or imply a
fact that does not exist (such as that the speaker has some special moral insight). When all the
relevant facts about the world and the speaker are disclosed to the audience, the speaker's as-
sertions of value will themselves be inert and thus of no interest to the government.
ALEXANDER, supra note 45, at 71 (emphases omitted). Pornography is a counterexample. Just what
false factual claim does pornography (explicitly or implicitly) communicate?
71. See, e.g., RA. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
72. See, e.g., id. at 399-403 (White, J., concurring).
73. It is also worth noting that the Supreme Court itself admitted that viewpoint was at issue in
pornography regulation when, in describing what it took to be the state's legitimate interest in suppress-
ing obscenity, it declared that "a sensitive, key relationship of human existence, central to family life,
community welfare, and the development of human personality, can be debased and distorted by crass
commercial exploitation of sex." Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 63 (1973) (citations
omitted). The state's interest is in suppressing what it regards as a "debased and distorted" viewpoint.
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Sherman shows just how pornography affects politics. Gay pornogra-
phy offers to its audience a controversial conception of the good achievable
by sex-one that many people regard, at that time, as "debased and dis-
torted." Some members of the audience-specifically, young gay men-
read and are aroused. Arousal is persuasion, in just the way contemplated
by Scanlon. These men then seek to persuade their fellow citizens, that
same-sex relationships are good and ought to be recognized by the law. The
upshot has been, amid some nasty, continuing political struggles, a major
change in the law: as this is written, nearly a quarter of the population of
the United States lives in a jurisdiction that recognizes same-sex relation-
ships as marriages or their functional equivalent.74 It is hard to imagine
how that could have happened if the state could have prevented the trans-
mission from mind to mind of the thought that gay sex is good.
CONCLUSION
The Madisonian argument does not settle the question whether por-
nography ought to be constitutionally protected. We have not yet consid-
ered the question of the countervailing state interest. Even if a given kind
of speech is presumptively protected by Madisonian considerations, there
still may be an overriding reason for suppression, either from within the
political perspective or from outside it. One would have to consider and
weigh those reasons. 75 But Sherman shows that suppression raises deep
Madisonian concerns.
When such speech is suppressed, it is not the case that "the nature of the content discrimination is such
that there is no realistic possibility that official suppression of ideas is afoot." R.A. V., 505 U.S. at 390.
Official suppression of ideas is precisely what the prohibition of pornography seeks to accomplish.
74. Based on U.S. Census population figures for 2008: U.S., 304,059,724; Massachusetts,
6,497,967; Connecticut, 3,501,252; Iowa, 3,002,555; Vermont, 621,270; California, 36,756,666; New
Hampshire, 1,315,809; New Jersey, 8,682,661; Oregon, 3,790,060; Washington, 6,549,224. The first
four of these call the relationships "marriage," while the others use "domestic partnerships" or "civil
unions." See CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 297-299.6 (West 2007); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 457-A:1 to 457-
A:8 (LexisNexis 2008); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 26:8A-1 to 26:8A-13 (West 2007); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§§ 37:1-28 to 37:1-36 (West 2008); OR. REV. STAT. note following § 106.990 (2007); WASH. REV.
CODE, Ch. 26.60. The nine states combined add up to 70,717,464, or 23% of the U.S. All figures are
taken from U.S. Census Bureau, American Factfinder, http://factfinder.census.gov.
75. See Andrew Koppelman, Why Phyllis Schlafly is Right (But Wrong) About Pornography, 31
HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 105 (2008); Andrew Koppelman, Eros, Civilization, and Harry Clor, 31
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 855 (2007); Andrew Koppelman, Does Obscenity Cause Moral
Harm?, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1635 (2005); Andrew Koppelman, Reading Lolita at Guantnamo: Or,
This Page Cannot be Displayed, DissENT, Spring 2006, at 64.
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